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Abstrakt 
Korupčné priestupky v maďarskom trestnom práve sú upravené v 27. kapi-
tole Trestného zákona z roku 2012. Nový trestný zákon zjednodušil štruktúru 
trestných činov, a preto upravuje zločiny proti čistote verejného života a medzi-
národného verejného života v tej istej kapitole – pretože trestný čin a sankcie 
sú rovnaké. Oznamovanie ako moderná forma činnosti v oblasti dodržiava-
nia súladu a základ pre interné vyšetrovanie môže byť relevantným nástrojom 
boja proti korupčným trestným činom, pretože je už zrejmé, že zaobchádzanie 
s takýmito aktivitami v rámci tradičného vnútroštátneho zločineckého rámca 
(vyšetrovacie orgány, trestné stíhanie, trestný súd) sa stáva čoraz menej upoko-
jujúcim. Informátor môže byť definovaný ako organizačný alebo inštitucionálny 
„zasvätený“, ktorý odhaľuje priestupky v rámci alebo touto organizáciou, alebo 
inštitúciou niekomu inému, s úmyslom alebo účinkom, že by sa potom mali 
podniknúť kroky na ich riešenie. Táto štúdia ponúka stručný prehľad korupč-
ných trestných činov a oznamovania z pohľadu príslušných maďarských práv-
nych predpisov s niektorými návrhmi k ďalšiemu výskumu.
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Abstract
Corruption Offences in the Hungarian Criminal Law are regulated in the 
27th Chapter of the Criminal Code from 2012. The new Criminal Code simpli-
fied the structure of the criminal offences, so that it regulates crimes against the 
purity of public life and international public life in the same chapter, since the 
criminal act and sanctions are the same regarding these crimes. Whistleblow-
ing as a modern form of compliance activites and a basis for internal investi-
gations can be a relevant tool for combatting corporate wrongdoings (such as 
fraud or corruption offences), because it is already evident that the handling of 
such activities within the traditional national criminal framework (investigative 
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authority, prosecution, criminal court) is becoming a less and less reassuring 
prospect. Whistleblower can be described as an organizational or institutional 
‘insider’ who reveals wrongdoing within or by that organization or institution, 
to someone else, with the intention or effect that action should then be taken to 
address it. Accordingly this study offers a brief overview of corruption offences 
and whistleblowing particularly under the relevant Hungarian legislation with 
some proposals for further research.
Keywords: bribery, compliance, corruption, whistleblowing 
Corruption Offences in the Hungarian Criminal Law
The expression ’corruption’ came from the latin ’corrumpo’. It is a term usu-
ally used by the criminology, but ordinary language too. Since the recent Crimi-
nal Code is in force in Hungary, we also use this expression in the substanstive 
criminal law, because the name of the Chapter including bribery and other akin 
crimes is now called ’Corruption Offences’. In most common sense we can de-
fine corruption as an abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Another short 
definition says, that corruption is: Wrongdoing on the part of an authority or 
powerful party through means that are illegitimate, immoral, or incompatible 
with ethical standards. It’s also an interdisciplinary issue, because it can be ob-
served for instance by criminology, criminal statistics or – and that’s why I’m 
here today – in the point of view of substantive criminal law.1 
In Hungary, in the last twenty years a considerable number of international 
instruments were adopted to oblige states to criminalize certain forms of cor-
ruptive behaviour. The corruption offences in the recent Hungarian Criminal 
Code are regulated in the 27th Chapter of the Code. We know nine corruption 
offences: 
a) bribery (Article 290),
b) accepting bribery (Article 291),
c) bribery of public officials (Article 293), 
d) accepting bribery as public official (Article 294), 
e) bribery in court or administrative proceedings (Article 295), 
1 See KEREZSI, Klára – INZELT, Éva – LÉVAY, Miklós. Korrupciós bűncselekmények a büntető 
igazságszolgáltatás tükrében. Milyen cselekményeket rejtenek a jogerősen elítéltek aktái? In 
VÓKÓ, György (editor). Kriminológiai Tanulmányok 51. Budapest : Országos Kriminológiai 
Intézet, 2014, p. 26.
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f) accepting bribery in court or administrative proceedings (Article 296),
g) buying of influence (Article 298), 
h) influence peddling (Article 299),
i) failure to report corruption (Article 299/A). 
Although we have to mention, that the last one, ’failure to report corrup-
tion’ is not an independent, but an accessorial kind of offence. It’s a pity, but 
we don’t have enough place to analyse all these crimes in details, that’s why 
I decided to introduce only the most common features of Corruption Offences 
in Hungary.2
First of all we have to mention, that the regulation is conform with the Eu-
ropean and international standards.3 All required forms of the passive cor-
ruption in economy and in public officials are punishable. The new Criminal 
Code simplified the structure of the criminal offences, so that it regulates crimes 
against the purity of public life and international public life in the same chapter, 
since the criminal act and sanctions are the same regarding these crimes. The 
legally protected object of these crimes is the purity of public life (and interna-
tional public life) and the purity of economic and social relations.4 The object 
of the committed crime is the so-called unlawful advantage, which can be fi-
nancial, personal or even moral. All corruption offences have an „active” and 
a „passive” side. If we would like to compose it simply: active is who pays and 
passive is who‘s paid, although it does not mean, that the „passive” side cannot 
request the unlawful advantage at the first place. This kind of regulation has 
a serious dogmatical relevance: both the active and the passive sides are direct 
perpetrators, thus their criminal liablity is independent of each other. 
2 For an overview on the Hungarian regulation see HOLLÁN, Miklós. Korrupciós bűncselekmé-
nyek az új büntetőkódexben. Budapest : HVG-ORAC, 2014.
3 For instance: Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ fi-
nancial interests (27 September 1996); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (adopted on 
27 November 1999 in the framework of Council of Europe); Resolution (97) 24 of the Com-
mittee of Members of the Council of Europe: Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against 
Corruption; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions; The Reports on Group of States against Corruption (GRECO – 
1999); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee of 6 June 2011 – Fighting corruption in the EU 
[COM (2011) 308].
4 According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the recent Criminal Code.
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All the corruption offences are so-called immaterial criminal offences, 
which means that they are completed in that case too, if the perpetrator doesn’t 
give, only promises unlawful adventure. That is why an attempt at corruption 
crimes is almost impossible. The corruption offences are intentionally commit-
ted criminal offences, so as a main rule, they cannot be committed by negli-
gence. Although we have to mention, that there in an exception: according to 
the Article 293, paragraph 5, for a criminal offence, imprisonment of up to two 
years shall be punishable by the head of an economic entity, an inspector or an 
authorized person performing an activity for the enterprise or for an enterprise, 
if the offence specified in paragraph 4 could not have been committed without 
his/her negligence. 
In general, the Hungarian Criminal Code obliges judges to impose rather 
severe sanctions, especially for the „passive” side of corruption: In most severe 
cases – if there is a concrete misconduct or breach of obligation related to the 
act – the punishment can add up to ten years of imprisonment. Confiscation as 
a preventive measure shall be imposed when the bribed person gets the advan-
tage during a corruption crime from the active briber.5
According to the criminal statistics, 1,105 cases in 2013, 3,268 cases in 2014, 
761 cases in 2015 and finally 984 cases in 2016 has became known by the po-
lice.6 In 2014, as you see, the number of corruption offences was extremely 
high, but only one singular crime series (commited by a criminal organization) 
caused the increase, in 2015 the number decreased again.
Now I would like to introduce some criminological aspects of corruption 
in Hungary: a) First and foremost there is a very high latency, for the reason 
probably, that these crimes are „good for both parties”. b) Criminal law only 
can deal with petty corrupction, e.g. if a speedster gives 6,000 HUF – about 
20 EUR – to the policeman to let him go. c) Unlawful advantage mostly means 
cash in Hungary.7 d) The most common corruption offence is usually bribery 
in public officials, and most of the registered corruption cases come from the 
public sphere. The reason for that situation is that the Act XXXIV of 1994 on 
the Police regulates the so-called ‘reliability test’ wherein policemen are tested if 
5 BKv 78. (Opinion of the Penal Board of Supreme Court).
6 Hungarian Prosecutor General’s Reports to Parliament, 2016. Available at: http://ugyeszseg.hu/
pdf/ogy_besz/ogy_beszamolo_2016_eng.pdf 
7 KEREZSI, Klára – INZELT, Éva – LÉVAY, Miklós, ref. 1, p. 47.
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they accept the offered unlawful advantage or not. e) Encouraging whistleblow-
ers can be a possible solution combating corruption offences.
Whistleblowing as an anti-corruption tool
Corruption offences and many other kind of offences, for example: fraud 
are often committed in connection with a company or public institution. In this 
case we can call them ’corporate wrongdoings’. We also have to mention, that 
in these kind of cases criminal proceedings is very rare. This does not mean 
that such forms of conduct occur only sporadically. However, investigating and 
proving these crimes is unusually difficult, and, as such, latency in this area is 
especially high.8 It is already evident that the handling of such activities within 
the traditional national criminal framework (investigative authority, prosecu-
tion, criminal court) is becoming a less and less reassuring prospect. To prevent, 
uncover, and handle such deeds, corporate compliance activities offer an effec-
tive solution in the most general sense. A very often cited subcategory of com-
pliance known as whistleblowing, or in other words, ‘public interest discloser’. 
The phenomenon of whistleblowing cannot be reduced to a single and exact 
concept. Instead, it is only possible to grasp some of its specific characteris-
tics.9 In 2014, a cross-continental group of researchers released the Interna-
tional Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. It defines a whistleblower as 
a member of an institution or company who engages in the “disclosure of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to per-
sons or organizations that may be able to effect action”.10 However, this general 
definition, according to many, could require further categorization. 
For instance, Daniel Westman delineated three subcategories: active, pas-
sive, and embryonic whistleblowing. Active whistleblowing refers to individuals 
who make an actual disclosure, while passive covers employees who refuse to 
carry out their employer’s orders when they believe these to be illegal. Embry-
onic whistleblowing can be both active and passive, though the individual is 
removed from his or her position prior to disclosure due to a lack of trust.11
8 BROWN, A. J. et al. (editors). International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Cheltenham : 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 33.
9 SCHIRMER, Günter – COLIVER, Sandra. Resolution 2060 on Improving the Protection of 
Whistle-blowers. In International Legal Materials, 2015, vol. 54, no. 6, p. 1131.
10 BROWN, A.J., ref. 8, p. 33.
11 WESTMAN, Daniel P. Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge Washington DC : The 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1991, p. 19-20.
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Robert Vaughn distinguishes between legal and illegal, or in other words, 
direct and indirect whistleblowing.12 The basis of this differentiation is whether 
the addressee of the disclosure has a right to initiate proceedings or sanction. 
An example of a situation where this is not the case occurs when whistleblowing 
is conducted through the media.13
Amanda Leiter divides whistleblowing into hard and soft variants. Under 
the second category she includes employee declarations which do not conflict 
with any company rules, legal or moral, though, according to the discloser’s 
position, they refer to arbitrary or reckless activities.14 
Finally, the most commonly used categorization fits whistleblowing into in-
ternal and external forms. The former contains the case of when the disclosure 
takes place within one of the company’s internal forums. The external whistle-
blower, however, divulges to an entity independent from the company. We can 
also speak of a mixed whistleblowing system if the announcer can turn to both 
internal and external forums.15
The cradle of (modern) whistleblowing is undoubtedly the United States. 
Not only is it true that America has the most extensive body of regulation relat-
ing to the field as well as the most comprehensive academic coverage,16 but it 
was here that whistleblowing went through its greatest transformations, often 
as a result of historical circumstances. Initially, the whistleblower was viewed as 
a “spy” or “informer,” and his or her disclosure was more likely to be consid-
ered treacherous than benevolent.17 With the passage of time, the term turned 
increasingly neutral, while the literature started to depict the whistleblower as 
a simple “informant.”18 Lately, in no small part thanks to the corporate scandals 
12 VAUGHN, Robert G. The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws Cheltenham : Elgar 
Publishing, 2012, p. 11.
13 FISHER, James et al. Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the Finan-
cial Services Industries. In Dickinson Journal of International Law, 2000, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 128.
14 LEITER, Amanda C. Soft Whistleblowing. In Georgia Law Review, 2014, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 436.
15 ALDER, James N. – DANIELS, Mark. Managing the Whistleblowing Employee. In The Labour 
Lawyer, 1992, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 27., KOHN, Stephen M. Concepts and Procedures in Whistleblower 
Law. Wesport : Quorum Books, 2001, p. 23.
16 Beyond a legal analysis, the issue is also examined from an ethical perspective by RICH, Mi-
chael L. Lessons of Disloyality in the World of Criminal Informants. In American Criminal Law 
Review, 2012, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 1498-1507.
17 LOBEL, Orly. Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing 
Effective Reporting Systems. In South Texas Law Review, 2012, vol. 54, no. 1, p. 40.
18  PAPANDREA, Mary-Rose. Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the 
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effected by such disclosures, the whistleblower grew into an object of public 
admiration. As Yale professor Jonathan Macey mentions in one of his writings, 
TIME Magazine, referring to those who provided effective aid to the authori-
ties in locating certain terrorists after the 9/11 attacks, declared 2002 the Year 
of the Whistleblower.19 
The construction of a rather modern federal whistleblowing regime was ini-
tiated in the 1970s mainly due to the Watergate scandal, which brought down 
President Richard Nixon.20 Following the Enron and Worldcom scandals, 
a new milestone was reached with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). On 
the theoretical level, this law viewed whistleblowing as an essential element 
of responsible corporate management. In the vein of this conceptualization, 
it intended to strengthen whistleblower protections, encouraged anonymous 
announcements, prescribed criminal law sanctions against those persecuting 
disclosers, and clarified the lawful channels for disclosure. Nonetheless, it was 
the target of much criticism focusing on the high financial cost of its imple-
mentation and its discriminatory character in relation to smaller and foreign 
companies.21
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (com-
monly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act), which amended the SOX Act, was 
passed in 2010 following the 2007 start and 2008 global deepening of the Great 
Recession and the election of Barack Obama. A relevant innovation in this leg-
islation allowed the whistleblower to receive 10 – 30 % of the fine with which 
the employer was struck. This created financial incentives for would-be whistle-
blowers. At the same time, as immediately noted by academia, this measure 
could have greatly increased the number of opportunistic employees who made 
unsupported claims.22 Partly due to this feature, the Obama era saw a spike in 
whistleblowers sanctioned for unlawful disclosures.23 
First Amendment. In Boston University Law Review, 2014, vol. 94, no. 2, p. 483.
19 MACEY, Jonathan. Getting the Word Out about Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of Whistleb-
lowing and Insider Trading. In Michigan Law Review, 2007, vol. 105, no. 8, p. 1901.
20 TILY, Stephen Coleman. National Security Whistleblowing vs. Dodd-Frank Whistleblowing: 
Finding a Balance and a Mechanism to Encourage National Security Whistleblowers. In Bro-
oklyn Law Review, 2015, vol. 80, no. 3, p. 1196.
21 DWORKIN, Terry Morehead. SOX and Whistleblowing. In Michigan Law Review, 2007, 
vol. 105, no. 8, p. 1758.
22 KING, Meghan Elizabeth. Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Amendments: the Case 
Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
In American Criminal Law Review, 2011, vol. 48., no. 3, p. 1463.
23  ZENOR, Meghan Jason. Damming the Leaks: Balancing National Security Whistleblowing and 
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In 2010, two controversial events occurred relating to the broader concept of 
whistleblowing. The first was the case of Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. 
Manning leaked more than 700,000 classified documents to the operators of the 
Wikileaks website and was consequently sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment 
in 2013. However, President Obama, in one of his last official acts, pardoned her 
in January 2017 and discounted her sentence by 29 years. The second affair was 
that of former NSA and CIA officer Edward Snowden, who revealed classified 
information on American intelligence agencies and subsequently fled to Russia.
The Council of Europe began planning whistleblowing recommendations 
in 2010. As a part of this effort, a commission explored the subject, chiefly 
by reviewing US regulations. Based on the commission’s report – which gave 
a concrete definition of whistleblowing – the Committee of Ministers passed 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7. This document called for the creation of 
relevant regulations within member states, and it noted that these regulations 
should give due consideration to human rights. After this, especially due to the 
previously-mentioned Snowden affair, events started to speed up. Two reports 
were completed in January and May 2015, respectively, to facilitate safeguards 
for whistleblowers. These recommended setting up whistleblowing regimes in 
both the public and private sectors, the establishment of independent author-
ities to monitor these regimes, and taking steps to ensure the protection of 
whistleblowers who are exposed to domestic persecution.24
Examining the relevant Hungarian rules, it becomes evident that its roots 
reach back to the middle of the socialist period – to the time of the communist 
era. Then, after a brief legislative detour, the legislative initiatives of the most 
recent period opened a fundamentally new chapter in the story of reporting 
abuses.
The first appearance of these was a legislation in effect from 1977 until Hun-
gary’s 2004 EU accession: Act I of 1977 on Public Interest Disclosures, Recom-
mendations, and Complaints. It first of all defined the public interest disclosure 
and it also must be highlighted that this law already emphasized the protection 
of the discloser, and, as such, allowed anonymous reports. If, however, it became 
clear that the discloser acted in bad faith, his or her identity had to be revealed.
the Public Interest. In Lincoln Memorial University Law Review, 2015, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 89-90.
24 SCHIRMER, Günter – COLIVER, Sandra, ref. 9, p. 1131.
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The next stop was Act CLXIII of 2009 on the Protection of Fair Procedure 
and Related Amendments. This was not at all akin to the previous regulation, 
but, as the relevant parliamentary memorandum states, it utilized certain solu-
tions from the US. It mentioned for instance expressis verbis the whistleblowing 
phenomenon. The law prescribed fine for offenders. There was also sanction 
for a person making an unfounded claim and the law also intended to establish 
a Public Procurement and Advocacy Authority,25 but after the regime changed 
in 2010 finally it never materialized.
The current legal environment was created by Act CLXV of 2013 on Com-
plaints and Public Interest Disclosures („the complaint law”), which came into 
force on 1 January 2014. This law can be described as one enabling disclosures 
in both the state and private sectors.
According to the definition in § 1(3), a disclosure „calls attention to a cir-
cumstance the remedying or discontinuation of which is in the interest of the 
community or the whole society. A public interest disclosure may also contain 
a proposal.” The public interest disclosure must be evaluated within thirty days. 
This code introduced the institution of discloser protection lawyer. The goal 
of this legal institution is for „the principal to engage the discloser protection 
lawyer within a tripartite legal relationship to receive in its name disclosures re-
lating to the principal either from its employees or external partners”.26 A simi-
larly novel solution is the creation of whistleblowing systems. which is briefly an 
anonymous reporting system within the company for the employees to report 
corporate wrongdoings. If there is a suspicion of a criminal offence based on 
the employees report, a so-called internal investigation can be made. If the in-
ternal investigation conducted as a result of whistleblowing yields suspicions of 
a crime, the question arises whether the company has a duty to make a crimi-
nal complaint. The complaint law states the criminal complaint in these cases is 
mandatory for the company.
Conclusion and Recommandations
Finally, these are my recommandations for the future’s legislation and prac-
tice. My position is that the proposition, which states that at least some compa-
nies must be legally required to set up and run whistleblowing systems, needs 
25 According to the preamble of the Act to increase efficiency in combating corruption.
26 According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Act.
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to be considered and debated carefully. It is possible that a threshold could be 
established based on revenue or the number of employees, and the establish-
ment of a system could be mandated once this threshold is reached. 
It is also worth considering making certain benefits conditional on the 
establishment of control systems, such as tax breaks (e.g. on corporate and 
dividend tax) or more lenient legal consequences if a wrongdoing done for the 
company’s benefit (or in its name) is uncovered.
It seems unavoidable to have to contemplate the popularization of disclo-
sure and best practices from the United States or Western Europe. The best-
constructed whistleblowing system will remain ineffective if it is not used by 
the employees.
Finally, my stance is that the key to all problems arising in connection with 
whistleblowing systems is the individual. Therefore, it is useful for increasing 
awareness and developing conscious employee behaviors to have annually re-
curring and mandatory training sessions, as these can provide up-to-date infor-
mation on the current legal environment and continuously-changing corporate 
mechanisms. It could be a powerful weapon for combatting corruption offences.
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IV. EKONOMICKÉ ASPEKTY KORUPCIE
